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ACCESS TO JUSTICE: AGAIN, STILL
Deborah L. Rhode*
It is a great honor to have provided the occasion for such a
distinguished group of colleagues to address such a crucial topic. I am
deeply grateful to all the participants, and especially to Bruce Green,
for organizing the colloquium and providing such a gracious foreword.
The generous and insightful comments of colleagues who bring such
commitment to these issues mean more than I can adequately express.
Few issues are more central to our legal system and more neglected
in our legal policy debates than access to justice. The recent
presidential campaign is a case in point. We heard endlessly about the
problem of too much law: the frivolous litigation that is driving up the
costs of malpractice insurance and medical care. We heard almost
nothing about the opposite and far more pervasive problem of too
little law: the public's inadequate assistance for crucial legal needs. It
is a shameful irony that the nation with the most lawyers has among
the least adequate systems for ensuring legal assistance. It is more
shameful still that the inadequacies attract so little concern. This
colloquium refocuses our attention on what is missing or marginal in
our policy agenda. How can we ensure some reasonable access to
justice for the vast majority of Americans of limited means who are
now priced out of the legal system?
The strengths of the preceding essays speak for themselves, and I
find little with which to disagree. The point of this brief response is
simply to address certain core issues the symposium raises.
One central theme of Access to Justice is the disconnect between
America's aspirational principles and actual practices. "Equal justice
under law" is the ideal that we inscribe on courthouse doors. It comes
nowhere close to describing what goes on inside them. Most
Americans of limited means lack any access to the justice system, let
alone equal access. Our current structure fails to meet an estimated
four-fifths of the civil legal needs of the poor, as well as two to three-
fifths of the needs of middle-income individuals.1 Government aid
budgets are capped at ludicrous levels, which make consistently
* Ernest F. McFarland Professor of Law; Director of the Center on Ethics, Stanford
University. This Essay draws on Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice (2004), as well
as articles that have included or adapted some of its analysis. The extensive
documentation in the book and related publications is not replicated here.
1. See Deborah L. Rhode, Access to Justice 3 (2004).
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effective assistance of counsel a statistical impossibility.2 The doctrine
governing effective assistance of counsel is a due process disaster.
Courts have upheld convictions where lawyers were on drugs, asleep,
or parking their cars during key parts of the prosecutors' cases.3
What accounts for this mismatch between our legal ideals and
institutions? One obvious answer is resources. Money may not be the
root of all evil in our justice system, but the lack of money is surely a
critical contributor. Over the last two decades, national spending on
legal aid has been cut by a third.4 The result is that fewer than 1% of
American lawyers are in legal services practice, which works out to
about one lawyer for every 1400 poor or near poor person, and a per
capita annual expenditure for civil legal aid of only about $2.25.' For
that amount, not much due process is available.
In criminal cases, although some defense lawyers provide
exceptionally able representation, indigent defense systems are
typically understaffed and underfunded. Many jurisdictions limit
compensation to $1000 for felony cases, which can work out to hourly
rates below the minimum wage.6 Caseloads can run as high as 700
felonies a year, over four times the maximum prescribed by the
National Legal Aid and Defender Association.7 For most indigent
defense attorneys, adequate preparation is a quick route to financial
ruin. Lawyers for poor defendants receive on average one-eighth of
the resources per case available to prosecutors.8  Under these
circumstances, courts cannot afford to be too choosy about the quality
of representation that they find acceptable. As Lawrence Friedman
puts it, "any old lawyer will do."9 Lawrence Marshall recounts chilling
examples of the sort that Access to Justice also chronicles.' ° Even in
death penalty cases, judges have routinely appointed attorneys with
histories of substance abuse, mental health difficulties, and
disciplinary violations, and have failed to demand any experience or
2. Id.; see also Bruce A. Green, Criminal Neglect: Indigent Defense from a Legal
Ethics Perspective, 52 Emory L.J. 1169, 1179-84 (2003); Leonard Post, Indigent
Defense Services Blasted, Nat'l L.J., July 12, 2004, at 1.
3. Rhode, supra note 1, at 4.
4. See id. at3.
5. Id. at 4, 106.
6. Id. at 128; see also Vivian Berger, Time for a Real Raise, Nat'l L.J., Sept. 13,
2004, at 27.
7. Rhode, supra note 1, at 4, 126-27; Leonard Post, Citing Low Pay, Lawyers
Refuse Indigent Cases, Nat'l L.J., Aug. 23, 2004, at 4 (discussing Louisiana caseloads).
8. Rhode, supra note 1, at 123.
9. Lawrence M. Friedman, Access to Justice: Some Comments, 73 Fordham L.
Rev. 927, 927 (2004).
10. Lawrence C. Marshall, Gideon's Paradox, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 955, 956-59
(2004).
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expertise in criminal law." In this system, it is generally riskier to be
poor and innocent than guilty and rich. 2
Money is the root of other problems as well. The bar's desire to
protect lawyers from nonlawyer competitors has encouraged
prohibitions on unauthorized practice of law that are sweeping in
scope and unsupportable in practice. The dominant approach is to
prohibit lay provision of personalized legal services. Yet as is clear
from the comparative research that Deborah Cantrell's essay and
Access to Justice summarize, nonlawyer specialists are generally at
least as qualified as lawyers to provide assistance on routine matters
where legal needs are greatest. 3 Although the public has justifiable
concerns about unqualified or unethical lay assistance, these abuses
are not the only targets of unauthorized practice doctrine. And they
could be more effectively addressed through more narrowly drawn
prohibitions, and adequate licensing and enforcement structures
governing nonlawyer providers.14 The primary obstacles to such
reforms are lawyers, and their influence among elected legislators and
judges. 5
The bar's self-interest has also worked against other structural
reforms that would reduce reliance on law and lawyers. Procedural
simplification, court reforms, and subsidized assistance for
unrepresented parties could make dispute resolution systems more
fair and accessible to those of limited means. Yet all too often, the
profession has been more the problem than the solution. In courts
that handle housing, bankruptcy, small claims, and family matters,
parties without lawyers are less the exception than the rule.16 But the
11. Rhode, supra note 1, at 140.
12. See id. at 122, 125, 138; see also Steven B. Bright, Counsel for the Poor: The
Death Sentence Not for the Worst Crime but for the Worst Lawyer, 103 Yale L.J. 1835,
1850-54 (1994).
13. See Rhode, supra note 1, at 89; see also Herbert M. Kritzer, Legal Advocacy:
Lawyers and Nonlawyers at Work 193-202 (1998); Deborah J. Cantrell, The
Obligation of Legal Aid Lawyers to Champion Practice by Nonlawyers, 73 Fordham
L. Rev. 883, 884-91 (2004).
14. For examples of such proposals, see Rhode, supra note 1, at 90-91; Suzanne J.
Schmitz, What's the Harm?: Rethinking the Role of Domestic Violence Advocates and
the Unauthorized Practice of Law, 10 Wm. & Mary J. Women & L. 295, 312-17 (2004).
For the need for better enforcement against incompetent and unethical assistance, see
Milagros Cisneros, H.B. 2659: Notorious Notaries-How Arizona is Curbing Notario
Fraud in the Immigrant Community, 32 Ariz. St. L.J. 287, 301-07 (2000), and Patrick
McGreevy, Los Angeles; 18 Charged in Sting Targeting Immigrant Fraud, L.A. Times,
May 14, 2003, at B3.
15. I have chronicled this opposition for well over a quarter century, beginning
with the study launched while a student in Stephen Wizner's legal clinic. For
discussion of that study, see Cantrell, supra note 13, at 885-86. For other bar
campaigns, see Rhode, supra note 1, at 75-76, 87-88; Deborah L. Rhode, In the
Interests of Justice 135-39 (2002) [hereinafter Rhode, In the Interests of Justice];
Jonathan Rose, Unauthorized Practice of Law in Arizona: A Legal and Political
Problem that Won't Go Away, 34 Ariz. St. L.J. 585 (2002).
16. Rhode, supra note 1, at 14, 82.
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systems in which these parties operate have been designed by and for
lawyers, and too little effort has focused on making them accessible to
the average claimant. All too often, as Norman Spaulding notes,
campaigns for direct public access to law have been stifled or co-
opted; participants have been forced to settle for slightly greater (but
still inadequate) access to lawyers instead.17 Effective alternative
models are in ample supply, but a majority of surveyed courts have no
formal pro se assistance services, and many of the services that are
available are inadequate, especially for those who need help most:
uneducated litigants with limited competence and English language
skills.18 Gary Blasi's essay, as well as my own book, provide telling
examples of how ill-designed pro se assistance programs can fall short
in improving actual outcomes.19
What blocks the path to effective reforms is not, of course, only
money. Many strategies concerning unauthorized practice doctrine
and court reforms that would improve the public's access to routine
legal assistance would cost relatively little. Other reforms, such as
increasing the budgets of criminal and civil legal aid, would serve the
profession's self-interest by increasing jobs and compensation,
promoting fair outcomes, and preempting calls for less palatable
changes in the delivery of services. From the taxpayer's perspective,
the price of these increased subsidies would be relatively small,
compared with other legal expenditures.2" Of the one hundred billion
dollars we spend annually on law enforcement, only about 2-3% goes
to indigent defense.2' Of our total legal expenditures, less than 1%
goes to civil legal assistance.22 A modest increase in civil and criminal
aid funding could help close the gap between ideals and institutions in
our justice system.
What stands in the way is not so much money as ignorance and
indifference. Professor Friedman puts it bluntly and all too
accurately: On issues of access to justice, "the level of public...
misinformation is simply appalling. ' 23  Four-fifths of Americans
believe, incorrectly, that the poor are entitled to counsel in civil cases;
only a third think that low-income individuals would have difficulty
finding legal assistance, a perception wildly out of touch with reality.24
Legal aid programs can address only about a fifth of the needs of
17. Norman W. Spaulding, The Luxury of the Law: The Codification Movement
and The Right to Counsel, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 983, 985 (2004).
18. Rhode, supra note 1, at 83; see also Sean Groom, Courthouse Pro-Bono,
Wash. Lawyer, June 2004, at 21.
19. Rhode, supra note 1, at 119; Gary Blasi, How Much Access? How Much
Justice?, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 865 (2004).
20. Rhode, supra note 1, at 123, 187; Friedman, supra note 9, at 932.
21. Rhode, supra note 1, at 123.
22. Id. at 106, 186.
23. Friedman, supra note 9, at 928.
24. Rhode, supra note 1, at 4.
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eligible clients and often can offer only brief advice, not the full range
of services necessary.25 In some impoverished urban and rural areas,
the situation is still worse, and waiting lists of two years for
26nonemergencies are common. Entire categories of the "unworthy"
poor, such as prisoners and undocumented immigrants, are ineligible
for aid from government-funded programs and have nowhere else to
go. 27 Such programs are also barred by statute from providing the
kinds of legislative and organizing assistance that could be most
effective in addressing the root cause of poverty, not just its legal
symptoms. 28 As the essays by Professors Blasi and Hobbs note,
representation of low-income communities is often most crucial in the
legislative and political arenas where policies are established and
resources are allocated.29  Yet that is precisely the kind of
representation that the public has been least willing to subsidize. And
although the vast majority of Americans support civil legal assistance,
they would rather see it come from volunteer attorneys than from
government-funded organizations, and 40% favor only advice, not
representation at trial.30
When it comes to litigation in any context, the public generally
wants less not more. Four-fifths of surveyed Americans also believe
that lawyers file too many frivolous cases, a belief fostered by
corporate campaigns that are long on folklore and short on facts.31 In
the world that the insurance industry portrays, "fat cat" attorneys and
avaricious plaintiffs are "living in the lap of luxury," while
bankrupting businesses, clogging the courts, and pricing insurance out
of reach.32 Yet in the world that disinterested researchers document,
the more serious problem is undercompensation, not overreaching.
Studies of unsafe products, negligent medical care, and automobile
and airline accidents find that the tort liability system reimburses only
4-6% of victims' costs.33
25. Id. at 13.
26. For example, the District of Columbia meets only 10% of the need. See
Jonathan Smith, Taking the Stand: Community in Need, Securing Equal Access to
Justice, Wash. Lawyer, May 2003, at 38. For the needs of rural poor, see Rhode, supra
note 1, at 118; and Deborah L. Rhode, Rural Justice, Retooled, Equal Justice
Magazine, Summer 2004, available at www.ejm.lsc.gov/EJMIssue6/ourview.htm.
27. Rhode, supra note 1, at 3-4, 13. The eligibility restrictions appear at 45 C.F.R.
§ 1611 (2003).
28. Rhode, supra note 1, at 13; see also 45 C.F.R. §§ 1610-1642.
29. Blasi, supra note 19, at 880-81; Steven H. Hobbs, Shout from Taller Rooftops:
A Response to Deborah L. Rhode's Access to Justice, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 935, 941
(2004).
30. Rhode, supra note 1, at 104; Beldon, Russonello & Stewart Research Assocs.,
National Survey on Civil Legal Aid (Apr. 2000) (unpublished report, on file with
author).
31. Rhode, supra note 1, at 26.
32. See id. at 26-27.
33. Id. at 31.
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That is not to suggest, as do most trial lawyers' campaigns, that the
answer is more litigation as we know it. Rather, the inconsistencies,
inefficiencies, and inequities of the current process call out for
reform.' In many areas of tort law, between half to two-thirds of the
recoveries paid by insurance companies are consumed by lawyers' fees
and legal expenses.35  Similar injuries yield dissimilar results,
depending on the effectiveness of each sides' lawyers, the location of
the lawsuit, and the defendant's assets.36 The high cost of litigation
prices modest claims out of the system entirely.37 Many countries
have developed more efficient dispute resolution processes, but as
Professor Friedman notes, most Americans remain resolutely ignorant
about alternatives and unwilling even to contemplate the possibility
that other systems might be better.38  Although four-fifths of the
public agrees that our adversarial process is too slow and costly, the
same proportion believe that it is the best in the world.39
Conventional wisdom about the criminal justice system reflects
similar levels of misinformation and complacency. About three-
quarters of Americans think that too many defendants get off on
"technicalities," a view reinforced by Hollywood dramas and celebrity
trials.4° But law in prime time is not law in real time. The attorneys
for O.J. Simpson may have left no stone unturned, but they were
charging by the stone, and the public was watching. In the unseen
world of indigent defense, 90% of those accused plead guilty, typically
without any significant time spent on their case.41 In Louisiana, for
example, the average indigent defendant gets eleven minutes of
attorney attention.4" Few Americans have any real appreciation of
what passes for justice among the have nots, and fewer still seem to
care. Less than half of those surveyed believe that defendants accused
of murder should get a new trial if they had an incompetent attorney.43
Even among lawyers, ignorance and indifference are all too
common. Surveying the gap between the profession's principles and
practices, Professor Pearce puts it bluntly: "[Tihe organized bar ....
refuses to acknowledge" this truth openly. 4 The problem begins in
law school. Issues involving access to justice are generally notable for
34. Id. at 31-37.
35. Id. at 34.
36. Id. at 36.
37. Id. at 34.
38. Friedman, supra note 9, at 930-31.
39. See Rhode, supra note 1, at 4, 32.
40. Id. at 124.
41. Id.
42. Post, supra note 2, at 21 (quoting David Carroll, Director of Research and
Evaluation of the National Legal Aid and Defender Association).
43. Rhode, supra note 1, at 124.
44. Russell G. Pearce, Redressing Inequality in the Market for Justice: Why Access
to Lawyers Will Never Solve the Problem and Why Rethinking the Role of Judges Will
Help, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 969, 969 (2004).
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their absence. The subject rarely arises in the core curriculum and
receives surprisingly little coverage even in professional responsibility
courses.45 Less than 1% of surveyed students recall any attention to
pro bono responsibilities in their legal ethics classes.46 Few schools
have a separate course on access to justice or ensure that most
students have some experience providing legal aid to those who
cannot afford it.47 A majority of law students graduate without doing
any pro bono legal work, and many of the governmental and
nonprofit opportunities that are available do not address those who
need help most.48 Nor has legal education given priority to the kinds
of transformative clinical and public service experiences that Anthony
Alfieri, Steve Wizner, and Jane Aiken advocate, which integrate
theory and practice and build commitments to social justice.49
The lack of exposure continues in practice. As noted earlier, less
than 1% of lawyers work for legal aid organizations, and few of the
remainder contribute in other ways. The best available estimates
indicate that lawyers' annual pro bono contributions average only half
an hour a week and half a dollar a day, and little of that assistance
goes to low-income clients.50 Fewer than 10% of practitioners accept
referrals from federally-funded legal aid offices or bar-sponsored,
poverty-related programs.51  As long as chronically underserved
groups remain out of sight and out of mind, they can be viewed as
someone else's responsibility. Although the organized bar strongly
supports increased public funding for legal services, it strongly
opposes requirements of increased contributions from lawyers.
Proposals for mandatory pro bono assistance have come and gone, but
largely gone. 2 The vast majority of attorneys resist any public service
45. Even the most casual scan of leading constitutional law, civil procedure, and
professional responsibility casebooks suggests the gaps. There are, of course,
exceptions in the legal ethics field, including not only Deborah L. Rhode & David
Luban, Legal Ethics (4th ed. 2004), but also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., The Law
and Ethics of Lawyering (2d ed. 1994).
46. Rhode, supra note 1, at 192. The survey sampled some 3000 students from six
different schools. It is excerpted in Chapter 7 of Access to Justice, supra note 1, and in
Deborah L. Rhode, Pro Bono in Principle and in Practice, 53 J. Legal Educ. 413
(2003). The full study appears in Deborah L. Rhode, Public Service and the
Professions: Pro Bono in Principle and in Practice (forthcoming 2005) (manuscript on
file with author) [hereinafter Rhode, Public Service and the Professions].
47. There is only one casebook on the subject. See Martha R. Mahoney et al.,
Social Justice: Professionals, Communities, and Law (2003).
48. Rhode, supra note 1, at 156-57; Rhode, Public Service and the Professions,
supra note 46.
49. See Anthony V. Alfieri, Teaching Ethics/Doing Justice, 73 Fordham L. Rev.
851 (2004); Stephen Wizner & Jane Aiken, Teaching and Doing: The Role of Law
School Clinics in Enhancing Access to Justice, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 997 (2004).
50. Rhode, supra note 1, at 154; Rhode, Public Service and the Professions, supra
note 46, at 25.
51. Rhode, supra note 1, at 154.
52. For the history, see Rhode, supra note 1, at 65-66, 152-53; and Rhode, Public
Service and the Professions, supra note 46.
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obligations, and only three states even require practitioners to report
voluntary service.53 In the face of such bar opposition, most elected
state judges understandably have no interest in mandating service or
equivalent financial contributions.
Nor has the judiciary been willing to intervene in other ways to
insure a more equitable justice system. In 1956, in Griffin v. Illinois,
the Supreme Court observed that "[t]here can be no equal justice
where the kind of trial a man gets depends on the amount of money
he has."54 Over the next half century, American courts repeatedly
have witnessed the truth of that observation, and repeatedly have
failed to address it. These failures have occurred along multiple
dimensions. In civil cases, except in a few highly limited
circumstances, courts have declined to require any legal assistance, let
alone equal or adequate assistance. In the civil and criminal
proceedings where courts have recognized a right to representation,
they have failed to insure that it meets acceptable standards.
The extent of judicial tolerance is well illustrated by the
jurisprudence that has developed to determine how much dozing is
constitutionally permissible. As one judge famously put it: "[T]he
Constitution says that everyone is entitled to an attorney of their
choice. But the Constitution does not say that the lawyer has to be
awake."55  Other courts have agreed, and some have employed a
detailed three-step analysis: did counsel sleep for repeated and
prolonged periods, was counsel actually unconscious, and were crucial
defense interests at stake while counsel was asleep?56 The irony in
relying on the trial record to determine if crucial interests were
jeopardized seems to be lost on many judges. How can the record be
adequate if the lawyer responsible for making it was napping?
Not only have courts been reluctant to set aside convictions for
ineffective assistance of counsel, they have been equally unwilling to
address the financial and caseload pressures that produce it.
Challenges to inadequate statutory fees for private attorneys and
excessive assignments for public defenders have seldom been
successful, and discipline for incompetent performance is rarer still.57
Indeed, judges who face crushing caseloads often have been reluctant
to encourage effective advocacy that would result in more time-
53. Rhode, Public Service and the Professions, supra note 46.
54. Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12, 19 (1956).
55. McFarland v. State, 928 S.W. 2d 482, 506 n.20 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996); Rhode,
supra note 1, at 137; Bruce Shapiro, Sleeping Lawyer Syndrome, The Nation, Apr. 7,
1997, at 27-29 (quoting Judge Doug Shaver).
56. See, e.g., Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 341 (5th Cir. 2001), cert. denied,
535 U.S. 1120 (2002); Tippins v. Walker, 77 F.3d 682, 687-90 (2d Cir. 1996); Burdine v.
Texas, 66 F. Supp. 2d 854, 863-64 (S.D. Tex. 1999).
57. Rhode, supra note 1, at 13, 131-32; Dennis E. Curtis & Judith Resnik, Grieving
Criminal Defense Lawyers, 70 Fordham L. Rev. 1615, 1617-21 (2002); Green, supra
note 2, at 1196.
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consuming trials and pretrial matters. Some courts will even withhold
appointments from lawyers who provide such advocacy.58
In civil cases, few judges have taken the proactive role that Russell
Pearce and Norman Spaulding have argued is necessary to prevent
demonstrable injustice.59 In a society that allocates legal assistance
primarily by market methods and allows vast disparities in wealth,
equal access to justice is an unrealistic aspiration.' But adequate
access to justice is an attainable goal, as is judicial intervention to
promote more equitable results. Many countries with fewer resources
have more generous systems of legal aid, more accessible systems of
dispute resolution, and more active roles for courts in promoting
procedural fairness.61 The gross inequalities that the American justice
system tolerates are an embarrassment to a country that considers its
legal system a model for the rest of the world.
It is equally shameful that my own wing of the profession has shown
similar indifference. Present company of course excepted, most legal
academics have done little to educate themselves, the profession, or
the public about access to justice and the strategies necessary to
increase it. To borrow Steven Hobbs' apt phrase, we are not shouting
from rooftops about unmet needs; we are not, for the most part, even
murmuring in classrooms or muttering in law reviews.62 We have
made almost no attempts to provide the research that Professor Blasi
notes is essential to assess potential reform efforts.63 As Access to
Justice similarly observes, we know far too little about the
performance of programs for the delivery of legal aid and pro bono
services: the satisfaction of clients, the quality of assistance, and the
impact on parties and their communities.' We have also failed to
institutionalize the kinds of exemplary interdisciplinary collaboration
and partnerships with community organizations that Professor Alfieri
leads at the University of Miami's Center on Ethics and Public
Service. As legal academics, we have unique opportunities to
58. See Rhode, supra note 1, at 128; see also Catherine Greene Burnett et al., In
Pursuit of Independent, Qualified, and Effective Counsel: The Past and Future of
Indigent Criminal Defense in Texas, 42 S. Tex. L. Rev. 595, 622, 641 (2001); Green,
supra note 2, at 1196-99; Marshall, supra note 10, at 956-57.
59. See Russell Engler, And Justice for All-Including the Unrepresented Poor:
Revisiting the Roles of the Judges, Mediators, and Clerks, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 1987
(1999); Pearce, supra note 44; Richard Zorza, The Disconnect Between the
Requirements of Judicial Neutrality and Those of the Appearance of Neutrality when
Parties Appear Pro Se: Causes, Solutions, Recommendations, and Implications, 17
Geo. J. Legal Ethics 423 (2004).
60. Rhode, supra note 1, at 5-7.
61. See id. at 7, 112, 117; Rhode & Luban, supra note 45, at 164-73.
62. Hobbs, supra note 29, at 951.
63. Blasi, supra note 19, at 866.
64. Rhode, supra note 1, at 120-21.
65. Alfieri, supra note 49, at 860-62.
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improve the system in which we work. Our curricular, research, and
service priorities should reflect as much.
Access to Justice begins with a historical overview and concludes
with an ambitious "roadmap for reform."66 In assessing the proposed
reforms, Professor Friedman finds it "hard to resist a certain amount
of pessimism."'67 The injustices that the book chronicles are deeply
rooted in American culture, as are the obstacles to addressing them.
Yet despite the ignorance, indifference, and self-interest that work
against progressive change, the history of social justice campaigns
offers grounds for at least cautious optimism. In 1919, when Reginald
Heber Smith published his classic account of Justice and the Poor,
criminal defendants had no right to counsel, and the entire nation had
only sixty full-time legal aid attorneys, with a combined budget of less
than $200,000.68 The bar had no organized pro bono programs, law
schools had no clinics, and the profession had no concept of public
interest law. To paraphrase Martin Luther King, we aren't where we
need to be, we aren't where we should be, we aren't where we hope to
be, but at least we aren't where we were.69
Moreover, some powerful forces can be marshaled in support of
further reform. The most obvious is public discontent with law and
lawyering. At last count, Google recorded some 800,000 legal humor
websites, and their frequently unflattering content underscores a
widespread desire for change.7° The public sees too much law for
those who can afford it, and too little for everyone else. In civil
matters, Americans are frustrated by the expense of litigation and the
barriers to self-representation. And at least some aspects of the
criminal process also cause concern. Fewer than half of surveyed
Americans believe that the legal system treats all racial and ethnic
groups the same, and part of the reason for the difference is the
inadequate legal assistance available to low-income minority
defendants.7"
So too, as Professor Marshall's experience with the Innocence
Project demonstrates, when poor lawyering leads to demonstrably
erroneous convictions, the public and their political leaders can be
moved to act. These cases evoke concern not only for the innocent
defendants who are imprisoned, but also for the guilty who remain
free and who may commit further offenses. The argument for greater
resources for indigent defense can thus be cast as an argument for a
66. See Rhode, supra note 1, at 47-48, 185-94.
67. Friedman, supra note 9, at 932.
68. Rhode, supra note 1, at 22.
69. Rev. Martin Luther King, Jr., Remarks at the American Jewish Committee
58th Annual Meeting (May 20, 1965), available at
http://www.ajc.org/InTheMedia/Publications.asp?did-403&pid=930 (last visited Nov.
15, 2003).
70. Rhode, supra note 1, at 194.
71. Id. at 123; ABA, Perceptions of the U.S. Justice System 65 (2000).
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more accurate criminal justice process. The case can also be made in
purely economic terms. As Professor Marshall's essay notes, wrongful
convictions are staggeringly expensive; the price includes not just the
costs of incarceration, but also multiple trials and appeals, and
sometimes civil damages for the innocent defendants.72  An
investment in lawyering that could prevent such errors seems well
worth the expenditure. Illinois is a case history in which such
arguments proved at least partially successful. A well-publicized
series of death row exonerations led not only to a moratorium on
capital sentences but also to other safeguards including higher
standards for lawyers in death penalty cases.73 That experience could
serve as a model for similar initiatives elsewhere.
Forces within the bar can also lay foundations for broader reforms.
When asked about major issues facing the profession, lawyers
consistently put public image and credibility at the top of the list.74
One of the best ways to improve that image, according to popular
opinion surveys, is for attorneys to help increase the affordability and
accessibility of legal services.75 Many judges are also concerned about
public credibility, and would like to improve courts' capacity to cope
with unrepresented or inadequately represented parties.76 Such
concerns have encouraged the creation of task forces or other official
bodies focusing on access to justice in about three quarters of the
states.77
So too, many individual lawyers have much to gain, personally and
professionally, from greater involvement with issues of social justice.
Public interest and pro bono service can enhance skills, contacts,
reputation, and psychological well-being." Too few lawyers now have
adequate opportunities for such work. In my own national study of
some 3000 lawyers, fewer than half of those responding were satisfied
with the amount of time that they were able to spend on pro bono
activities.79 Bar association surveys also consistently find that lawyers'
72. Marshall, supra note 10, at 957-59; see also Rhode, supra note 1, at 141.
73. See Rhode, supra note 1, at 141; Marshall supra note 10, at 958-59.
74. Rhode, In the Interests of Justice, supra note 15, at 5.
75. In one representative survey, which asked what would improve the image of
lawyers, the response most often chosen was their provision of free legal services to
the needy. Peter D. Hart Research Assocs., A Survey of Attitudes Nationwide
Toward Lawyers and the Legal System 29 (1993); Rhode, supra note 1, at 147. For
public concern about the expense of law and lawyers, see supra note 6 and
accompanying text, and In the Interests of Justice, supra note 15, at 3-5.
76. See Charles L. Owen et al., Access to Justice: Meeting the Needs of Self-
Represented Litigants 3-19 (2002); Rhode, supra note 1, at 85-86.
77. ABA & Nat'l Legal Aid and.Defender Ass'n, Supporting Partnerships to
Expand Access to Justice: Twelve Lessons from Successful State Access to Justice
Efforts (2003); Rhode, supra note 1, at 194.
78. Rhode, supra note 1, at 147, 164; Rhode, Public Service and the Professions,
supra note 46, at 252-54.
79. Rhode, supra note 1, at 170; Rhode, Public Service and the Professions, supra
note 46, at 266-67.
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greatest source of dissatisfaction with practice is their "lack of
connection to the social good."8 Involvement in public service is a
way to reestablish that link.
Of course, neither lawyers nor the public speak with one voice on
the necessary directions for reform. Nor do they agree on key
definitional issues: What counts as pro bono? What do we mean by
justice? How much access is necessary? How can we best achieve it?
One of the most critical questions is, as Professor Blasi notes, whether
we should be primarily concerned with parties' subjective perceptions
of fairness, or alternatively, with more objective measures of
outcome? 8 My own view, set forth at greater length in Access to
Justice, is that both the fact and appearance of fairness matter. That
position seems consistent with other commentary here, but we need
not reach consensus on all these conceptual issues in order to make
substantial progress. Americans generally agree on certain core
principles that can serve as benchmarks for progress:
Individuals should have access to legal services and dispute
resolution processes that are fair, efficient, and affordable.
Individuals who need, but cannot realistically pay the full price of
assistance should be eligible for competent aid.
Individuals should have well-designed opportunities to address their
legal needs themselves, and should have access to services that
would make self help effective.8 2
To bring us closer to these goals, Access to Justice and the
commentary that it has inspired here emphasize reforms on three
levels: resources, structure, and accountability.
First, we need to spend more, and more wisely, on both civil and
criminal legal assistance. Our current allocations for legal aid are a
sixth to a fifteenth of the budgets of other countries with similar legal
systems.83 For a nation that will soon be paying more than $200 billion
to safeguard the rule of law in Iraq, a modest increase in support of
the rule of law at home should not be unthinkable.' That increase
could enable government-subsidized programs both to assist a
broader group of individuals, and to provide more effective
representation for those eligible for assistance. Sweeping restrictions
could be lifted on the kinds of cases and types of representation that
qualify for government funding. Many European and British
Commonwealth countries have systems that could serve as models for
80. ABA Young Lawyers Div., Career Satisfaction Survey 28 (2000); ABA Young
Lawyers Div., Career Satisfaction Survey 11 (1995); Rhode, supra note 1, at 147.
81. Blasi, supra note 19, at 870-79; see also Rhode, supra note 1, at 6.
82. Rhode, supra note 1, at 185.
83. Id. at 112, 186.
84. See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Checking the Facts, in Advance, N.Y. Times, Oct. 12,
2004, at A6.
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reform. 5 Typically, they allocate aid on a sliding scale so that
individuals of limited means can receive at least partially subsidized
services. Rather than excluding broad categories of unpopular clients,
other countries focus on the merits of the claim. Does the individual
have a reasonable probability of success? What would be the likely
benefits of providing aid and the harms of withholding it? Similar tests
could be adapted for civil matters in this country. The advantage of
such expanded coverage is that it would meet crucial needs that are
now priced out of the system. It would also attract broader support
than the current program, which serves only the most economically
disadvantaged and politically powerless communities.
In criminal cases, all jurisdictions should aim for what bar
commissions recommend: a rough parity of resources between
defense and prosecution.86 Statutory fees should be set at rates that
permit adequate preparation, and caseloads should not exceed bar
guidelines for competent representation. Financial support for this
expansion in both criminal and civil legal aid could come through
more politically acceptable measures than a general tax increase, such
as a targeted tax on law firm revenues or an increased surcharge on
court filing fees for cases over a certain financial level.87
Additional support could also come from lawyers' pro bono
services. One obvious strategy is for courts or bar associations to
require some modest contribution to legal aid or public interest
programs. Resistance to such requirements might be reduced by
providing a broad array of service opportunities, along with training
and back-up assistance, and by allowing financial contributions as a
substitute for time. Even if skeptics are correct that rules mandating
pro bono work would be difficult to enforce, the benefits might still be
substantial. At the very least, these requirements would support the
many lawyers who would like more pro bono involvement, but who
are in workplaces that fail to provide adequate resources or credit for
such work. A less controversial alternative would be to require
reporting of the contributions that lawyers and legal employers make
to legal aid and public interest causes. Experience to date indicates
that such reporting rules have led to modest increases in the resources
available to poverty law organizations.88 Further improvements might
result if contribution rates were widely publicized, and if clients,
85. Christine Parker, Just Lawyers: Regulation and Access to Justice 33-35
(1999); Rhode, supra note 1, at 104, 187; Gary Bellow, Legal Services in Comparative
Perspective, 5 Md. J. Contemp. Legal Issues 371, 375-76 (1994); Deborah L. Rhode, In
the Interests of Justice: A Comparative Perspective on Access to Legal Services and
Accountability of the Legal Profession, 56 Current Legal Probs. 93, 108 (2003).
86. Rhode, supra note 1, at 142, 187.
87. Id. at 188; Blasi, supra note 19, at 880-81.
88. Rhode, supra note 1, at 179; Rhode, Public Service and the Professions, supra
note 46, at 301.
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colleagues, and job candidates began paying more visible attention to
employers' pro bono records.
Even without changes in formal rules governing pro bono work,
legal employers and legal educators can do more to encourage
charitable commitments. They can impose their own service
requirements, and provide greater resources, rewards, and recognition
for pro bono service. They can also enlist more lawyers in the policy-
oriented activities that Professors Blasi and Hobbs emphasize. As
Martha Davis notes, further efforts should be made to ensure that
lawyers and law students have the kind of public service experiences
that are likely to build empathy and strengthen commitments to social
justice.89 That, in turn, may require administrators of law school and
bar pro bono programs to ensure increased opportunities for effective
training, guided reflection, and appropriate placements.
A second cluster of strategies should focus on structural changes
that would improve the functioning of dispute resolution processes
and the delivery of legal services. Access to law is not an end in itself;
the goal is justice, and formal proceedings or representation by
lawyers is not always the most effective way of addressing legal
concerns. Most individuals prefer to resolve law-related problems
directly outside of court, so one objective of reform should be to
promote more equitable dispute resolution processes in workplaces,
businesses, and other organizational settings.90
Civil courts should also redesign their own processes to reduce costs
and increase accessibility. The legal system as traditionally structured
is not an effective way of solving many disputes that involve modest
stakes or that reflect broader social problems. In most states, small
claims courts are too limited in jurisdiction, hours, location, and
enforcement power, and assistance for self-represented litigants in
these and other proceedings is inadequate at best.91 The tort system is
inconsistent and inefficient; relatively few accident victims can afford
it, and 50-60% of the payouts by defendant insurance companies end
up compensating lawyers.92 In other contexts, particularly those
involving families and petty offenses, overburdened trial courts lack
the time, resources, and remedial options to address the underlying
problems.93
89. Martha F. Davis, Access and Justice: The Transformative Potential of Pro
Bono Work, 73 Fordham L. Rev. 903, 922-24 (2004).
90. Rhode, supra note 1, at 86-87; Michael Zander, The State of Justice 28-32(2000).
91. Rhode, supra note 1, at 84.
92. See supra notes 33-34 and accompanying text.
93. Rhode, supra note 1, at 85; Tery Carter, Red Hook Experiment, ABA J., June
2004, at 37; see also Leonard Post, Courts Mix Justice with Social Work, Nat'l L.J.,
June 7, 2004, at Al.
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Alternative models are readily available. A growing number of
judicial systems offer more accessible and equitable processes that
should be widely available. Such innovations include:
online or automated document preparation services;
personalized multilingual help for pro se litigants;
simplified forms and procedures;
evening hours and community sites for hearings and legal assistance;
expanded jurisdiction for small claims courts;
specialized no-fault compensation systems in areas like medical
malpractice and automobile accidents; and
collaborative problem-solving tribunals that partner with other
social service providers.
94
Analogous reforms are necessary for the delivery of legal services.
In essence, Americans need a wider range of choices in law-related
assistance and better regulation of the choices that are available. Less
protection should be available for the professional monopoly and
more for individual consumers. Sweeping prohibitions on the
unauthorized practice of law should be replaced with appropriate
ethical standards and regulatory structures for lay providers. The
level of oversight should depend on nonlawyer specialists' ability to
provide adequate assistance, the seriousness of harm if they do not,
and the public's ability to assess providers' qualifications and remedy
any deficiencies in their performance. 95
A final set of strategies should focus on increasing the
accountability of the legal profession and the legal process. More
oversight is essential both for individual lawyers and for the systems
that structure their services. Courts and bar disciplinary agencies
should impose more frequent and significant sanctions for frivolous
claims and incompetent representation. Standards governing
ineffective assistance of counsel in criminal cases also must be
strengthened. Defendants should not have to prove their innocence in
order to obtain remedies if their lawyers are drunk, dozing, or
demonstrably ignorant of the relevant law or facts. It should be
enough to establish the likelihood that minimally competent
representation would have yielded a significantly better result.
Alternatively, as Professor Marshall suggests, if a defendant
establishes incompetence, the burden should shift to the state to prove
that the outcome would have been the same. 96
94. See Carter, supra note 93; Post, supra note 93.
95. Rhode, supra note 1, at 90-91.
96. Marshall, supra note 10, at 962; see also Rhode, supra note 1, at 135-36.
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Courts and legislatures must also assume greater responsibility to
ensure effective systems for funding and regulating legal services for
the poor. In civil cases, courts should be more willing to appoint
counsel where fundamental rights and substantial due process
concerns are at issue. The judiciary should also be more willing to
intervene to protect inadequately represented parties and to strike
down restrictions on government-subsidized services. In criminal
cases, courts should require appropriate compensation, resources, and
caseload limitations for indigent defense lawyers, as well as an
independent oversight body to monitor their appointment and
performance. This body should insure that counsel are qualified, that
their representation meets minimum standards, and that judges do not
use their appointment power to punish zealous advocates.
Government funding programs, bar associations, legal service
providers, and academic researchers should also join forces in
compiling better information on access to justice. We need to know
more about the effectiveness of specific strategies involving indigent
representation, self-help assistance, alternative dispute resolution, pro
bono programs, and related initiatives. Better data are necessary
concerning objective outcomes, client experiences, and community
impact. Only through more comprehensive evaluation can policy
makers develop appropriate resource priorities and reform agendas.
The urgency of reform must, in turn, be better communicated to the
general public. Bar associations can partner with other organizations
to raise the visibility of unmet needs and to promote the necessary
responses. The Virginia Indigent Defense Coalition and the blue
ribbon National Committee on the Right to Counsel are recent
examples of how to direct more attention and resources to chronically
underfunded causes.97
Finally, law schools should more actively promote access to justice
through research, teaching, and pro bono programs. Legal education
plays an important role in socializing the next generation of lawyers,
judges, scholars, and public policy makers to care about this issue and
to carry on where current efforts fall short. Stephen Wizner and Jane
Aiken remind us of the importance of that responsibility,98 and my
own experience offers an example of how it can matter. I was a
student in one of Professor Wizner's clinics. It kept me in law school.
97. See, e.g., Penny J. White, Mourning and Celebrating Gideon's Fortieth, 72
UMKC L. Rev. 515, 542 (2003). For information on the Virginia Indigent Defense
Coalition, see Va. Indigent Def. Coalition, A System in Crisis: Indigent Defense in
Virginia, at http://www.vidcoalition.org/crisis.html (last visited Oct. 30, 2004), and on
the National Committee on the Right to Counsel's Criminal Justice Reform
Federation Fund, see Press Release, Nat'l Comm. on the Right to Counsel, National
Committee on the Right to Counsel to Examine System of Legal Representation for
People Who Cannot Afford it (June 22, 2004), at
http://www.constitutionproject.org/rc/launch-release.doc.
98. See Wizner & Aiken, supra note 49.
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Although I took the course some thirty years ago, I can still recall one
pivotal moment. My first client, the mother of an ailing infant, was
sick, out of work, and late in her rent. At the request of the landlord,
the local utility company had turned off her heat and water. During
bitter New England winters, this was a frequently successful means of
forcing a tenant's immediate payment or departure. It was also
clearly illegal. With some effort I finally managed to locate the utility
company employee responsible. He professed total ignorance of the
statutory prohibition. Even to a naive first-year law student, that
seemed highly implausible, particularly since the legal aid office where
I was working had repeatedly complained to the company under
similar circumstances. With barely repressed rage, I read him the
relevant statute, described the infant's illness, and warned that if the
tenant's utilities were not turned on by the morning, I would spend my
next two and half years in law school figuring out how to make him
pay. How, exactly, I had no idea. Presumably, neither did he, but he
must have concluded that he had a loony law student on his hands
who just might try it. The next morning, my client had heat. I
experienced the power of the law.
I also experienced its limitations. Heat and water were a very small
part of what this woman needed, and our office was too understaffed
to untangle her other legal problems, let alone address the broader
social conditions that underpinned them. But the case gave me a
sense of what lawyers can do to promote justice at the individual and
policy level, and confirmed my decision to go to law school. As
gatekeepers to the profession, legal educators have a unique
opportunity and obligation to continue conveying these messages. I
am grateful to the editors and participants in this colloquium for their
contribution to that mission.
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